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Organizational success has been a much debated issue. Many theories were developed 
through last decades, from the Industrial Organizational model to the Resource-base view. 
Even with the progress of these theories, there always has been a gap regarding how 
companies succeed in a dynamic and turbulent environment, and the dynamic capabilities 
view (DCV) appeared in order to fill this gap. Regarding this view, several scholars developed 
their own proposals, but for this specific dissertation, the Barreto’s view (2010) was the chosen 
one not only because it is a recent perspective, but also because it considered the previous 
theoretical developments and empirical findings. More important, this was arguably the most 
appropriate view to allow the operationalization of the dynamic capability construct. 
This thesis intends to illustrate the DCV by using a case study, highlighting how adaptation to 
context changes can influence a company’s performance. It will be first analyzed how negative 
can be the impact on a firm if it is not attentive to market changes, and then, it will also be 
examined how the performance of a firm can be improved significantly by the strengthening of 
dynamic capabilities. 
I will answer the following questions: What strategic decisions can lead a well-established 
company to fail? What factors are critical in a turnaround? How do strategic decisions 
translate into changes in the resource base? 
The main findings of the case suggest that the four dimensions of the dynamic capabilities 
construct are crucial to explain both failure and success of a firm. In addition, it shows that 
these dimensions are interconnected. No dimension alone can represent the construct.  
To wrap up, dynamic capabilities can help a firm to achieve success in a turbulent environment 
and this specific case suggests that the four dimensions included in the dynamic capabilities 
construct are vital for the achievement of the success. 
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The dynamic capabilities topic has attracted a lot of attention since its first definition (Teece, 
Pisano & Shuen, 1997). The number of scientific articles considering dynamic capabilities as a 
key issue in strategy has been outstanding, but its use has also been impressive in other 
important areas in business administration, for example, in marketing (e.g. Menguc & Auh, 
2006), human resources management (e.g. Thompson, 2007), operations management (e.g. 
Sambamurthy, Bharadwaj & Grover, 2003) and entrepreneurship (e.g. Arthurs & Busenitz, 
2006).  
The dynamic capabilities view is seeking to provide an answer to the following question: “How 
can firms successfully build competitive advantages to respond to dynamic environments?”. 
Several approaches have been use to analyse competitive advantage. One explanation belongs 
to Porter’s competitive forces approach (1980) which suggests that industry structure strongly 
influences firm’s differentiated performance. Another approach, the strategic conflict 
approach (Shapiro, 1989) used game theory to analyze the nature of competitive interaction 
between rival firms.  Later on, the resource-based theory (Barney, 1991) concluded that firm-
specific resources and capabilities are the key determinants of heterogeneous performance 
across firms. However, none of those theories explains how to build successful advantages in a 
changing environment.  
Teece and colleagues proposed the dynamic capabilities framework to fill the gap (Teece, 
Pisano & Shuen, 1997). Afterwards, several alternative conceptualizations of dynamic 
capabilities were developed.  In this paper, I will use a specific definition of dynamic 
capabilities, which states that “a dynamic capability is the firm’s potential to systematically 
solve problems, formed by its propensity to sense opportunities and threats, to make timely 
and market-oriented decisions, and to change its resource base” (Barreto, 2010). Among all 
the definitions developed so far, I have chosen this definition, as it is a recent perspective, it 
considers the previous theoretical developments and empirical findings, and also enables a 
clear operationalization of the construct. 
Given the current global environment, it is very important and relevant to study the dynamic 
capability view.  In turbulent business environments, the possession of dynamic capabilities is 
quite relevant (Teece, 2007). Firms in highly dynamic environments, i.e., where there are 
frequent environmental shifts, need to build successive temporary advantages (D’Aveni, 1994; 




Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000). Creating moves and counter-moves to fight the competition and 
to build temporary advantage can lead to superior performance (D’Aveni, 1994).  
Given Barreto’s (2010) new and more rigorous definition of dynamic capabilities, it seems 
quite interesting to see whether and how this conceptualization applies to real-world 
situations.  By 2007, Samsonite’s performance decreased substantially and the company had 
to go through several strategic changes in order to get back on track. In this thesis, I will 
attempt to answer to the following questions:  What strategic decisions can lead a well-
established company to fail? What factors are critical in a turnaround? How do strategic 
decisions translate into changes in the resource base? 
I will focus on the four dimensions underlined by the definition of dynamic capacities and 
analyze its possible relevance within a specific firm competing in a dynamic environment. To 
analyze the topics above mentioned, this thesis will be composed by five main sections. There 
will be a literature review where I will summarize the main theoretical findings about dynamic 
capabilities. Afterwards, the Samsonite’s case will be described. In the third section, I will 
present the teaching note to answer some important questions about the case study. In the 
subsequent sections, I will present the discussion and the conclusion. Overall, I hope to better 
understand the role of dynamic capabilities and its four dimensions and to show the practical 






















II. LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
The origin of the dynamic capabilities view 
 
To better understand the dynamic capabilities view, it is important to consider the theories 
studied in the past. Some decades ago, several theories have emerged with the aim to explain 
how firms can successfully achieve competitive advantages. During the 80s, the dominant 
theory was the competitive force approach developed by Michael Porter (1980).  This model 
includes the five industry-level forces framework which determines the potential profit of an 
industry. According to this model, competitive formulation of a firm is related to its 
environment and the industry structure strongly influences the competitive rules of the game 
and consequently, the strategies of firms.  
Later on, a different theory appeared to explain how successfully competitive advantages are 
created and developed. The resource-based theory (Barney, 1991) assumes that resources and 
capabilities are heterogeneously distributed across firms and that such heterogeneity may 
persist over time. The real key factor to a firm’s success or even to its future development lies 
in its ability to find and create a competence that is truly distinctive (Learned et al., 1969). The 
main limitation of these two perspectives is that they do not explain firm’s competitive 
advantage in changing and dynamic environments (Priem & Butler, 2001). 
 
Evolution of the concept of dynamic capabilities 
 
All the previous theories were insufficient to explain the success of a firm in changing and 
dynamic environments and to fulfill this gap, the dynamic capability approach emerged. The 
first definition of dynamic capabilities was proposed as “the firm’s ability to integrate, build, 
and reconfigure internal and external competences to address rapidly changing environments” 
(Teece, Pisano and Shue, 1997). This definition presented significant limitations and it does not 
explain how some firms and not other achieve competitive advantage. 
 After that, new conceptualizations of dynamic capabilities were developed by other scholars. 
Eisenhardt & Martin (2000) came up with a different definition of dynamic capabilities as “the 
firm’s processes that use resources” and also suggested that “dynamic capabilities are the 
organizational and strategic routines by which firms achieve new resource configurations”.  
Later on, dynamic capability was considered as a “learned and stable pattern of collective 




activity through which the organization generates and modifies its operating routines in 
pursuit of improved effectiveness” ( Zollo & Winter, 2002).  
On the other hand, Winter (2003) suggested that dynamic capabilities should be seen in the 
context of two types of capabilities: the ordinary capability and the high-order capability. He 
also suggested that the high-order capabilities influence the ordinary ones, which allow short-
term survival. After a decade, Teece (2007), tried to redefine the concept of dynamic 
capabilities and he suggested that dynamic capabilities could be disaggregated into three 
dimensions: 1. the capacity to sense and shape opportunities and threats; 2.the capacity to 
seize opportunities and 3.the capacity to maintain competitiveness though enhancing, 
combining, protecting, and, when necessary, reconfiguring the business enterprise’s intangible 
and tangible assets. One major problem of these and other definitions of dynamic capabilities 
was that it was hard to test them empirically as they were too broad and often tautological 
 
New definition of dynamic capabilities 
 
Recently, a new definition was proposed as “the firm’s potential to systematically solve 
problems, formed by its propensity to sense opportunities and threats, to make timely and 
market-oriented decisions, and to change its resource base” (Barreto, 2010:271). 
 According to this definition, dynamic capability should be viewed as a multidimensional 
construct because it refers to four distinct but related dimensions, treated as a single 
theoretical concept. The four dimensions are interconnected and no dimension alone can 
represent the construct (Barreto, 2010). Although the four dimensions represent the specific 
components of the construct, there is no requirement about the level of correlation among 
them and some dimensions might even be poorly correlated (Law et al., 1998).  
The four dimensions emerged through past research from different scholars. The propensity to 
sense opportunities and threats is consistent with previous suggestions by Teece (2007) in his 
topic of “capacity to sensing opportunities and threats”. Other scholars mentioned the 
importance of “capability monitoring” as an important function in dynamic capabilities 
(Schreyogg & Kliesch-Eberl, 2007). Other considerations on the managerial framing of 
opportunities and threats as one key element of dynamic capabilities were also made (Gilbert, 
2006). 
 The propensity to make timely oriented decisions was also studied before by several scholars. 
Eisenhardt and Martin (2000: 1117) suggested that the potential for long competitive 
advantage lies not only in the ability to change existing resources but also in doing it sooner. 
Other scholars highlight the importance “to quickly accomplish reconfiguration and 




transformation ahead of competitors”, which recall the importance of firms in making 
decisions at the right time (Teece et al., 1997: 521).  
The propensity to make market-oriented decisions is also important. Adner and Helfat (2003) 
mentioned that although timely decision making is relevant for dynamic capabilities, the 
content of such decision is equally or even more important. Other findings have suggested that 
market orientation can be transformed into a dynamic capability when complemented by 
reconfiguration capabilities (Menguc and Auh, 2006).  
Finally, the propensity to change the resource base is in line with several earlier proposals 
(Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Helfat et al., 2007; Teece et al., 1997) and it includes firm’s 
propensity to create, extend and reconfigure the resource base.  Scholars have highlighted the 
importance of not only to make the right decisions at the right time, but also in building new 
resources configurations to achieve a long-term competitive advantage.  
 
Dynamic capabilities and its performance 
 
The relationship between firms’ dynamic capabilities and performance has also been a 
relevant topic. There are three main approaches presented in this field: The first approach 
stated that there is a direct relationship between firm’s dynamic capabilities and performance 
(Makadok, 2001; Teece et al., 1997; Zollo & Winter, 2002). Some scholars believe that dynamic 
capabilities theory explains the level of success and failure of the firms, competitive advantage 
and private wealth creation. Some of them consider the dynamic capabilities approach as a 
casual mechanism by which firms create profits. 
The second approach suggest that  dynamic capabilities do not necessarily lead to a superior 
performance (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Helfat et al, 2007) and that performance effects may 
depend on the characteristics of the resulting new resource configuration or on how managers 
use their dynamic capabilities. The scholars who defend this idea suggest that dynamic 
capabilities are necessary, but not sufficient conditions for competitive advantage. They also 
suggest that, in the long term, competitive advantage of a firm does not rely in dynamic 
capabilities themselves but on the resource configurations created by dynamic capabilities. 
According to this view, performance effects should be expected only if the new resource base 
proves to be valuable, rare, inimitate and nonsubstituable (Barney, 1991). 
The third approach considers that there is an indirect relationship between dynamic 
capabilities and performance (Zahra et al., 2006; Winter, 2003). The authors who defend this 
approach also consider that dynamic capabilities may damage rather than improve the firm’s 




performance if dynamic capabilities are used when there is no need or when assumptions used 
by firms are wrong. 
Returning to the main question regarding how firms can build competitive advantages in 
dynamic environments, this remains a very complex topic. Currently, we are living in a dynamic 
and changing environment, so adaptation is crucial for any firm. It is not possible neither 
realistic for any firm to maintain a unique and static competitive advantage and expect to 
survive in this current competitive market. Firms need to be able to achieve successive and 
temporary competitive advantages, to fight against the various exogenous shocks and 
ultimately to survive (D’Aveni, 1994; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Barreto, 2010). The field of 
strategic management and the dynamic capabilities framework recognizes that ‘strategic fit’ 
needs to be continuously achieved (Teece, 2007). However, there is no guarantee that by 
implementing dynamic capabilities, a firm will be able to perform well and to be ready to 
address all the exogenous shocks of the market. There are other variables that might influence 

















III. TEACHING CASE 
When Samsonite began to manufacture suitcases in 1910 in Denver as a local and family 
business, no one could imagine the growth this company would have. Jesse Shwayder was the 
founder and an entrepreneur with the vision of creating functional and durable suitcases, 
which at that time was a unique product. Until 1973 the company was managed by Shwayder’s 
family, and since then, the company has been a subsidiary of several conglomerate companies. 
In 2007, Samsonite was acquired by CVC Capital Partners for $1.7 billion, but few months after 
that, the company was forced into a debt-for-equity swap with its biggest lender, Royal Bank 
of Scotland (RBS). Due to this operation RBS got 30% stake while CVC held 70% of the 
company1. From this time until the end of 2008, the adjusted EBITDA of the company has 
decreased around 10%2 and the projections for the future were pessimistic. In an attempt to 
save the company, in 2009 Tim Parker, who was a member of the advisory board of CVC 
Capital Partners3, was appointed as CEO of Samsonite. Some reorganization measures were 
applied and on September 2nd, 2009 the company filed for Chapter 114 burdened by its $1.5b 
debt and its weak revenues. Two years after, the company was completing an initial public 
offering in the Hong Kong Stock Exchange5 and its success has represented a fantastic 
turnaround for Samsonite6. What type of strategic decisions lead Samsonite to such fragile 
position in 2009? How can a company be almost bankrupted and in a few years become a 
complete success? What measures could have been done in order to avoid the crisis?  
 
Company’s History Background 
Samsonite Group was founded by Jesse Shwayder (Exhibit 1) in 1910 in Denver, Colorado, 
United States, under the name of Shwayder Trunk Manufacturing Company. Shwayder who 
used to work for several years as a salesman in New York in a trunk and bag company decided 
to return to his hometown and with the age of 28 he started his own business.  With his life's 
savings of $3,5007 he began to manufacture wood trunks and suitcases (Exhibit 2) in a 50 × 125 
foot room that he had rented in downtown Denver.8 Shwayder burned through most of his 
$3,500 in savings during his first year of business, but he was able to borrow more money in 
order to keep his business on moving. 
 His four brothers joined him in 1912 and each one of them was charged by a department. 
Mark started to work on sales, Maurice and Ben focused on manufacturing and Sol became the 
company's attorney9. Later on, in 1916, the Shwayders took a picture that would become an 
advertising coup (Exhibit 3). In the picture, the five Shwayder brothers are standing on a board 
that is balanced on a Samsonite suitcase to demonstrate the strength of the suitcase10. The 




photo was used to advertise Samsonite luggage and the slogan used was "Strong enough to 
stand on”11. This became an excellent promotional and direct-mail advertising tool for several 
years. 
 The experience that Jesse Shwayder has acquired in New York helped him to develop an 
efficient strategy for his business, rather than trying to compete with other luggage companies 
on price, he decided to differentiate his products on quality. He started to focus his business in 
manufacturing luggage for turn-of-the century travellers, which were composed by a small and 
affluent group of people who appreciate unique, durable and finely crafted products12  and by 
1917 they were selling $76,000 worth of luggage annually throughout the Western United 
States.  At that time, the brothers felt the need to build a bigger plant to fulfill all the demand 
in the Western side of the United States and in 1924 they moved their operations into a new 
80,000 square foot factory in south Denver.  
With the Western United States side under control, the Shwayders leased an 85,000 square 
foot factory near Detroit to keep pace demand in Eastern United States in late 20s. At that 
time, the company covered all the United States market and its revenues bolted to more than 
$1 million. With that plant up and running, the company seemed almost unstoppable.  
Unfortunately, the 1929 stock market crash and succeeding Great Depression revoked that 
perception. Shwayder Trunk's shipments felt by 50 percent within few years and the brothers 
had some difficulties to meet payroll and pay their bills. At that time, they replaced lost 
luggage sales to manufacture other products, such as license plates, card tables, stilts, doggie 
dinettes and sandboxes. To reflect the diversification, the brothers changed the name of their 
company in 1931 to Shwayder Brothers, Inc. 13 and interestingly, the Shwayder's card table 
sales briefly surpassed luggage shipments during the 1930s. 
After this time of crisis, the company decided to focus again in its core business and in 1941 
launched a suitcase with the name of Samsonite. The reason for the chosen name was to 
highlight the strength and durability of the product and brand by taking its name from the 
biblical character Samson14, renowned for his strength. At that time, the company created its 
own logo, the Samson personage (Exhibit 4) in order to differentiate its brand from its 
competitors.  By 1948, the sales of the company had shot up to $13 million and its product line 
was considered an enormous success. 
Over the years, the market trends have changed and the wooden box construction gave way to 
a shift towards lighter materials, initially magnesium and ABS. In 1956, an innovative 
lightweight luggage line15 was launched and at that time, the Samsonite brand luggage was 
already a success. In the same year, the company expanded out of the United States for the 
first time. The company built its first subsidiary in Canada and it has also created an export 




sales department focused on Europe16. Because of the positive impact of the brand and this 
enormous development, in 1965 the company decided to change its name to Samsonite 
Corporation17 in order to capitalize the now-renowned Samsonite label.  
 
Becoming Global 
The corporate structure of the company remained within the family environment until 
beginning 1970s. Jesse Shwayder managed the company until 196218, and after his retirement, 
his son, King David Shwayer became in charged for the company and one of the responsible for 
its expansion. By the mid-1970s, the company had achieved a truly global presence and was 
the leading manufacturer of luggage in the world. The company, which was still headquartered 
in Denver, was employing a work force of 5,000 and boasted the largest and most advanced 
production facilities in the luggage and casual furniture industries19. 
After operating as an independent firm under the direction of the Shwayder family for more 
than 60 years, in 1973, Samsonite was purchased by Beatrice Foods Co. 20, and became its 
subsidiary. Beatrice allowed Samsonite to continue operating as an autonomous company, and 
has supported its expansion efforts financially.  
This change in the corporate structure led to some changes in the company, starting by the 
change of the company’s logo to the swirl image21, which is now used and it helped the 
company’s positioning in the market with a more formal and corporative image (Exhibit 5).  
The company also became more concerned with the market and consumer trends and several 
“firsts” were introduced in the market with the aim to anticipate and fulfil the changing 
requirements of travellers22.  In 1974, the first Samsonite suitcase on wheels was introduced 
representing a revolution in comfort and convenience for travels and later on, in 1986, the 
company developed a suitcase with a three point latching system, which became the best-
selling Samsonite product at that time (Exhibit 6).  
In the meanwhile, Samsonite belonged to various consumer goods conglomerate companies, 
but after 22 years working as a subsidiary, in 1995, the company merged with its former 
holding company at that time, Astrum International Corporation23, leaving once again 
Samsonite Corporation as an independent company. Since Astrum had purchased the 
American Tourister luggage company24 years before, when the merger happened, the new 
company was composed by Samsonite, American Tourister divisions and related operations. 
That purchase significantly enhanced Samsonite's lead in the domestic luggage market and 
expanded its scope to include some lower tier segments of the market.  
In 1997, with the beginning of the financial crisis in Asia (Exhibit 7), the company reinforced its 
strategy on the mature markets (North America and Europe), which represented 87% of the 




company sales and accounted for the majority of revenues of the company (Exhibit 8). In the 
same year, the company presented the first upright case with a balanced four-wheel system 
that allowed the traveler to push or pull their luggage and only after three years, in 2000, the 
four-wheel Samsonite Spinners were introduced (Exhibit 6), again, improving mobility, 
convenience and anticipating traveler’s needs.  
Until this time, the mature markets have been relatively constant. However, some saturation 
has been revealed when for the first time, the sales in mature markets decreased in 200025. To 
worsen the situation, several shocks on the market occurred, creating instability in the 
company. On September 2001, United States has suffered dramatic terrorist attacks which had 
put pressure on the travel industry, leaving the company under significant financial stress. 
Later on, in 2003, the SARS epidemic has negatively impacted the travel industry as well, and 
consequently, it has decreased the performance of the company (Exhibit 7). According to 
Gendreau, CFO of Samsonite, “the effects of those events (those which are not controlled by 
the company) typically lasted up to six months before the business recovered and returned to 
a growth trend”26  because of the direct correlation that exist between the travel industry and 
luggage industry trends.  
During that time, Samsonite Corporation’s common stock was listed on Nasdaq, but this only 
lasted until January 2002 when the company was delisted as a result of having a market 
capitalization lower than Nasdaq’s minimum requirements for listing. In 2002 the company lost 
ground in the domestic market, representing a decreased in the sales of 14% in North America 
and a decrease of 7% in overall market. From January 2002 until October 2007, Samsonite 
Corporation was publicly traded on the OTC Bulletin Board, where the share price never 
reached more than 1.5 USD (Exhibit 9). In the same period of time, the percentage of sales 
provided by mature markets has decreased substantially, in 2002 the mature markets 
accounted for 82% of the sales, while in 2007, the same markets accounted only for 73% of the 
sales. Due to this big change in the market, Samsonite has expanded its business in Asia by 
establishing Samsonite majority-owned joint ventures in Australia and Thailand with the aim to 
easily reach the Asian market27. 
The year of 2007 was a decisive year for the company; there was deterioration in global 
economic conditions which affected consumer confidence and spending, and which are 
directly correlated with the performance of the company. Although the overall sales of the 
company have increased approximately 4%, the adjusted EBITDA decreased approximately 
9.5%28. 
 Under such a pressure and unable to control the results of company, on July 5, 2007, the 
group was acquired by the private equity firms CVC Partners in an all-cash deal of about $1.7 




billion. The deal, which was approved by the board of Samsonite, valued positively the 
company at $1.49 a share. 29The acquisition did not affect the business operations of the group 
and did not result in the divestment of any group companies. However, this was not as 
successful as CVC Partners expected and one year later, Samsonite was forced into a debt-for-
equity swap with its biggest lender, Royal Bank of Scotland. The deal cut Samsonite's debt 
from about $800m to $240m and the structure of the company changed; RBS got 30% stake in 
Samonite while CVC held almost 70% of the company.30 
In 2008, while the total amount of sales of the company continued to increase, the adjusted 
EBITDA have decreased 10% for the second consecutive year. At this point in time, the Asian 
market accounted for 22% of the overall sales of Samsonite, while mature markets accounted 
for 69% of the sales31. 
Although the company’s adjusted EBITDA continued to diminish, Samsonite continued to be 
the leader in the luggage market with a market share of 9.6%. Its major competitor was VF 
Corporation which was comprised by Eastpak, Reef, and The North Face among other well 
known brands and held a market share of 3.1%. It is important to retain that this is a very 
segmented market where around 80% of the luggage market is composed by small local 
manufactures (Exhibit 10), so although the market share of Samsonite seems small, the 
company is far ahead of its competitors and has shown a solid and leading position in the 
market. 
In 2009, the sales of Samsonite on mature markets accounted around 65%, while the 
remaining 35% accounted for markets in Asia and Latin America32.  At this point in time, the 
global luggage industry was valued approximately US$24.7 billion, where Asia was considered 
the largest luggage market, comprising approximately 40% of the total market. The mature 
markets (North America and Europe) accounted for 53% of the total market. 
Although the total amount of retail sales of luggage has been increased over the time, as well 
as the sales of Samsonite, the different regions have shown a different evolution (Exhibit 11). 
The percentage of sales in North America, Europe and Japan were decreasing in comparison 
with the total amount of sales in the global luggage market, while the percentage of sales in 
Asian (without Japan) and Latin America were expected to increase significantly in comparison 
with the total amount of sales in the global luggage market (Exhibit 12). 
According to the consulting company Frost and Sullivan, the value spent per capita on 
expenditure on luggage is another factor that luggage companies should have in consideration 
when they are delineating their business strategies since it can gives a good measurement of 
the economic wealth of each zone. The expenditure on tourism and travel expands once the 
household’s disposable income grows beyond a level which covers its basic needs. Per capita 




expenditure on luggage was significantly lower in developing regions than it was in the 
developed markets of Japan, North America and Europe. However, the growth rate of 
expenditure on tourism and travel was much higher in developing countries than it was in 
developed countries, which means that the expenditure on tourism and travel was expected to 
increase a lot in Latin America and Asia (excluding Japan) and especially in India, China and 
South Korea (Exhibit 13).  
 
Moment of Truth 
 
At this point in time, Samsonite continued to be the leader in the luggage market with a 
market share much ahead of its competitors and with a small but consistent growth on sales. 
However, the adjusted EBITDA which is viewed as an important financial measure of the 
company’s overall profitability has decreased since 2007.  
Several factors have influenced this result, and according to Frost and Sullian consulting 
company, the luggage market has changed over the last decade. The mature markets which 
have been very constant over the last decades are now showing some signs of saturation and 
economic problems, while the markets in developing are showing an increase on the 
expenditure on travel and travel-related products.  
Adding to these occurrences, North America and Europe have suffered an economic and 
financial crisis which started exactly in the beginning of 2007 and according to Samsonite’s 
Chief Financial Officer “the recession has caused a severe decline in consumers purchasing 
travel-related goods and the company has responded to this critical situation with a 
substantial restructuring program”33, suggesting that this recession was the main cause of 
Samsonite’s poor performance. Sales of travel luggage, which makes up the majority of the 
sales for Samsonite, were significantly dependent on travel as a driver of consumer demand, 
which has decreased significantly with this recession.  
Strengthening this opinion, Don Chernoff, president of Skyroll, which makes roll-up luggage for 
air travels, suggested that he”knew this recession was going to be bad because it looked and 
felt a lot like what happened after [the attacks on Sept. 11, 2001], the big difference being that 
9/11 was a sharp spike down and rebounded quickly”, but "this time is much worse."34 
Independent of what has truly caused the bad performance of Samsonite, the results on 2009 
were catastrophic. The overall sales of the company dropped approximately 17.6% to 1029.4 
million of dollars in 2009 (Exhibit 14), while adjusted EBITDA have decreased almost 54% in the 
same period of time (Exhibit 15). It is also possible to perceive that during that period the most 
affected zones were Europe with a decreased of 25% on sales, Latin America with a decreased 




of 24% and North America with a decreased of 18%. Finally, the corporate costs of Samsonite 
had increased 68% between 2008 and 2009 and it had represented a huge proportion in 
comparison with the presented net income (Exhibit 16). 
With these poor results, Samsonite decided to make a reorganization of the company’s 
structure. Kyle Gendreau, CFO of  Samsonite Co. Stores of Samsonite Corp said that “realigning 
the company’s real estate portfolio will increase profitability, allowing us to further capitalize 




Given the huge drop in sales and in EBITDA’s values of the company in the beginning of 2009, 
the company felt the need to make an extreme reorganization inside the company. 
 
Changes in corporate structure 
In connection with the 2009 Reorganization, Samsonite Corporation was converted into 
Samsonite LLC, a Delaware limited liability company. Samsonite LLC was transferred at fair 
market value to a new Luxembourg holding structure, consisted of a series of seven 
Luxembourg-incorporated private limited companies, known as Luxcos 1-7. Luxco 1 is the 
holding company for the group, and Luxcos 2-7 are its wholly-owned subsidiaries. As a result, 
the group became tax resident in Luxembourg 36 and all the assets of Samsonite Corporation 
were acquired indirectly by Luxembourg subsidiaries of the company.  Luxembourg is 
considered one of Europe’s leading financial centers and it is a place which offers low effective 
corporate rates and various tax incentives37.  
Another change in the corporate structure during that time happened with the appointment of 
Tim Parker as CEO of the company. Parker, who was considered one of the best-known and 
successful turnaround managers in the UK, filed the Subsidiary Samsonite Company Stores, LLC 
into Chapter 11 by filing a petition in Delaware on September 2nd, 200938. Chapter 11 is the 
principal business reorganization chapter of the United States Bankruptcy Code and under the 
Chapter 11, a company is authorized to reorganize its business for the benefit of itself, its 
creditors and equity holders.  
According to the U.S. Bankruptcy Court in Wilmington, Delaware, the company listed $233 
million in assets and $1.5 billion in debt39 and facing this situation, some measures were 
applied. The company started by eliminating unnecessary global management team positions 
that duplicated functions in the regional operations and also decided to close the global 
executive headquarter in London. Besides that, the company has closed 84 underperforming 




retail stores in United States (out of 193) and 31 in Europe (out of 92); consequently, the 
number of employees was reduced as well by 115 in North America regional headquarters and 
by 505 in Europe regional headquarters. Apart from that, the company decided to end 
unprofitable non-core businesses such as luxury handbag joint ventures and its Italian-based 
shoe product line40. 
Regarding its operations, Samsonite has rationalized the manufacturing and distribution 
operations in Europe as well as the sales organization in Europe and Latin America by closing 
local sales offices and shifting toward third-party distributors. Finally, the company has 
negotiated lower freight prices and has improved the terms of trade and business relationships 
with suppliers.41  
 The company has reached an agreement with its creditors on the terms of a court-approved 
plan of reorganization, which included the repayment of its creditors. The 20 largest creditors 
without collateral backing their claims are owed a total of $920,30142. Athalon Sportgear Inc., 
owed $272,049 and was listed as the largest unsecured creditor. Parker, dubbed the "Prince of 
Darkness" by British union groups for his ruthless cost cutting, expects to save $100 million in 
annual costs and triple its EBITDA for the next year. 
As a result of the 2009 reorganization the ownership of the group was the following one: 
 
 
Note: (1) Management comprises certain members of management (excluding Tim Parker), current and former directors of the 
Group and industry advisors to the CVC Funds.43 
 
Regarding the joint ventures of the company, those would be treated as majority-owned 
subsidiaries in the group’s accounts. Under these arrangements and through trademark 
licensing agreements all the joint ventures produce and commercialize Samsonite and 
American Tourister brands and each one has its own board composition, voting at shareholder 
meetings and restrictions on the transfer of shares. Profits of the joint ventures are distributed 
by way of dividend in proportion to the interests held by us and our joint venture partners44. 
 
Change in strategy 
After all the measures done to reduce the cost base of Samsonite, the company felt the need 
to re-focus its strategies and its implementations. 
One of the objectives of the company was to strengthen the leading position of Samsonite, 
through continued investment in innovation and marketing and to achieve that, the company 




has planned to invest in the development of the products. Its goal was to introduce at least 
one major innovation product per year. The company decided to maintain a robust level of 
expenditure on product-focused advertising in order to emphasize the characteristics of 
functionality and durability of the brand and to support the brand globally and locally (Exhibit 
17).  
Furthermore, the company has decided to develop American Tourister as a brand that reflects 
its core values of quality and reliability at more accessible price points. This strategy enabled 
the company to penetrate in emerging markets, especially in India and China, through the 
growth of the emerging middle class. The company intended to develop American Tourister 
through advertising focused on Asia, increasing the number of points of sales and design 
products that correspond to the customer preferences. 45 
Since the company was a global leader in the luggage market, the company decided to take 
advantage of economies of scale in marketing, research and development, distribution and 
sourcing and in this way, the company would be able to save money. 
The company decided to focus on developing the company’s business in high growth Asian 
markets, particularly in China and India, through investment in marketing, further expansion of 
the distribution network, by increasing the existing points of sales, expanding geographical 
coverage and develop product ranges tailored to local customer’s preferences in each region.46 
In more mature markets, such as in Europe and North America, the company planned to use 
the existing strong brand awareness and its extensive distribution network to increase the 
company’s revenues and penetration of the business and casual product categories.47 
Moreover, the company decided to operate its business with a higher degree of autonomy in 
the four geographic regions of Asia, Europe, North America and Latin America, while retaining 
centralized management over brand consistency, sourcing and finance. This approach enabled 
Samsonite to implement appropriate business strategies for different regional consumer 
preferences and trends, market dynamics and economic conditions. 
Regarding the products offered by the company, its aim is to increase penetration of the 
business bags, casual bags and accessories product categories through sustained investment in 
product development, marketing and staff.  
Finally, the ultimate goal of Samsonite is to continue to increase the company’s adjusted 
EBITDA margin through expansion in the Asian markets by preserving its efficient cost base 
through managing supplier relationships and by maintaining fixed costs through efficiencies 
resulting from economies of scale48.  
 
 




The Turnaround   
 
One year after the 2009 reorganization and after the implementation of the new strategies, 
the company obtained amazing results. The sales of the company have growth exponentially 
(Exhibit 15) and as result of that, the adjusted EBITDA have increased around 241% (Exhibit 
16), reaching results never seen before.  The results of the business in Asia have increased 
around 60% and around 400% in Latin America. In the more mature markets which have 
suffered a very radical cost base reduction, the result was impressive as well. In North 
America, the profits increased around 866% and in Europe, the around 81%. The costs with the 
corporate structure have also decreased around 68% (Exhibit 16).  
In 2011, the results of the adjusted EBITDA continued to be very positive, showing a growth 
rate of 30% (Exhibit 15). The reorganization and new strategies implemented worked very 
well, the company has shown an impressive recovery, and to highlight this success, the 
company has completed its IPO on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange by raising HK$9.73 billion 
(US$1.25b) in the process, on June 16th, 2011. Hong Kong has been considered the biggest 
market for IPOs for the last years as London and New York have struggled in the wake of the 
financial crisis. 49 According to Kyle Gendreau, Samsonite CFO, Hong Kong was the “logical” 
listing venue for the company for both fundraising and strategic reasons. He also added that 
“Asia is Samsonite’s biggest, fastest growing and most profitable region” and “it’s also the 
region with the best long-term growth prospects for us.” 50 
The company and shareholders, including CVC and Royal Bank of Scotland Group, sold 671.2 
million shares, where 121.1 million were new issued shares and the remain 550.1 million 
belonged to CVC, RBS and several former and current employees of the company and were 
sold in a secondary offering.51 This process allowed a partial exit for its backers, enabling CVC 
Capital Partners and Royal Bank of Scotland, to sell down their stakes from 54.3% to 29.8%, 
and from 29.9% to 15.8% respectively.52 Later, on January 2013, the company sold 138.3 
million more shares, leaving CVC with a 9.7% position while RBS had 5.1%53. 
Regarding the price per share determined for Samsonite, just few days before the IPO, the 
company had narrowed the indicative price range from HK$13.5 -HK$17.50 to HK$14.50-
HK$15.50,54eventually being sold at HK$ 14.50 ($1.87) each share. This represents 18.3 times 
its projected 2011 earnings55. On average, the P/E ratio for Asia ex-Japan consumer companies 
is 20.1 times, according to CLSA estimates, so Samsonite transaction was below the Asian 
consumer companies’ average.  
Masahiko Ejiri, a Tokyo-based fund manager at Mizuho Asset Management Co. commented 
that “the timing of Samsonite’s listing isn’t that great” and that “the global economy might be 




weaker than expected, so people are just very cautious about buying into equities” explaining 
why the price per share of Samsonite was not higher. However, CFO Gendreu believed that 
“the IPO was really the best refinancing option in that it enabled the shareholders to achieve 
liquidity while allowing them to retain significant exposure to Samsonite’s future growth“.  
Samsonite was the fourth Hong Kong IPO exceeding $1 billion in 2011 and all four have 
dropped from their initial sale price in the first day of trading, by an average of 8 percent, 
according to Bloomberg data. In the case of Samsonite, its initial sale price fell 7.7 percent to 
HK$13.38 at the 4 p.m. close in Hong Kong56. Tim Parker, chief executive officer commented 
after the listing ceremony at the Hong Kong Stock Exchange that “where markets are at the 
moment, it’s a pretty tough place”, although, he felt that “this is a pretty good way to open, 
actually. I’m not at all displeased.”57 
Apart from that, Samsonite shares suffered some turbulence, falling sharply in subsequent 
weeks, drifting from their HK$14.5 (US$1.9) initial price down to HK$9.25 (US$1.19) by 
November (Exhibit 18). However, with the shares having made a spirited charge back toward 
their IPO level, in February they reached HK$14 (US$1.8) again. 
Raising capital was not the only motivation for the flotation. According to the CFO, the move 
was strategically advantageous and he believed that “listing on the Hong Kong Exchange 
helped to significantly raise our profile and that of our brands, especially in Asia, which has 
yielded excellent operational benefits”.  Gendreau also seemed confident in this approach and 
he believed that “this strategy leaves us well positioned to take the lion’s share of the growth 
in the luggage market in the next few years.”58 The company is betting on growth in Asia, 
where leisure travel is becoming increasingly affordable and where the market it is expanding 







































Source: http://www.lojasamsonite.com/sam-brand#  
 
 



































Exhibit 3 – Photo used for the first advertising campaign in 1916 with the slogan: “Strong 






























































Source: Samsonite official prospectus, 2011, History of Samsonite 
 
 
































































































































OTC Bulletin Board 
USD 
Exhibit 8 – Evolution of the total sales of Samsonite by zones 
 
Source: Osiris data 
 
 
Exhibit 9 – Samsonite’s share price on OTC Bulletin Board (in dollars) 





































































































































































































Exhibit 14- Evolution of total sales of Samsonite Corporation 
 
Source : Osiris database 
 
 
Exhibit 15 – Adjusted EBITDA of Samsonite 
 
Source: Samsonite Financial reports  
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Exhibit 17 – Examples of Samsonite advertising campaigns where the durability and 




















Exhibit 18 – 1910.HK Evolution of share price of Samsonite Corporation 
 
Source: Yahoo Finance- 
http://uk.finance.yahoo.com/echarts?s=1910.HK#symbol=1910.hk;range=2y;compare=;indicator=volume;charttype=area;crosshai
r=on;ohlcvalues=0;logscale=off;source=undefined; 
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IV. Teaching Note 
Synopsis 
The Samsonite group was founded in Denver, in 1910, by Jesse Shwayder who at that time 
decided to manufacture durable and functional suitcases for a small group of affluent people 
who used to travel around United States. The company became truly famous when 
manufactured a strong suitcase called Samsonite in 1941. The chosen name wanted to 
highlight the durability and strength of the brand honoring the biblical personage Samson and 
few years later, the brand was so successful that in 1965, the company changed the name to 
Samsonite Corporation. 
By mid-1970s, Samsonite was the leading manufacturer of luggage and it had a global 
presence in the world. Until 1973 the company was being managed by Shwayder family 
members, but after that time, Samsonite was bought by a bigger company and it became a 
subsidiary of Beatrice Foods Co. For the next 22 years, Samsonite belonged to several different 
holding companies, regained its independency again in 1995 when Samsonite merged with its 
holding company regained the name of Samsonite Corporation.  
Until January 2002, Samsonite was listed in NASDAQ, when after that was delisted due to its 
low revenues. From January 2002 until October 2007 the company was publicly traded on the 
OTC Bulletin Board, when after that date, it was remove. 
In July 2007, CVC Partner Capital acquired Samsonite for $ 1.7 b and this acquisition did not 
affect the business operations of the group. However, this was not as successful as CVC 
Partners was expecting and one year later, Samsonite was forced into a debt-for-equity swap 
with its biggest lender, Royal Bank of Scotland. The structure of the company changed and RBS 
got 30% of the company while CVC got the remained 70%. 
In 2009, as a result of the crisis in the financial sector, in the air traveling sector and as result of 
the changed on the luggage market trends, the profits of the company decreased substantially 
and the company felt the need of reorganization; Tim Parker was appointed CEO of the 
company and significant changes happened in the structure of the company as well as in its 
strategy. The results of this reorganization were quite positives and on June 2011 Samsonite 
has completed an IPO in the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong and has raised a total amount of $ 
1.25 billion dollars in this operation. 
This case examines how a leading and successful company forgot to look at the market trends 
and failed to see what was really important. The first section of the case was devoted to 
explain how Samsonite was founded and the concept behind its success. It covers the early 





years of the company and the different corporate structure that the company has had over the 
years. 
The second part of the case indicates how Samsonite became global and makes a brief 
overview of the global luggage market trends during the period of analysis.  
After that, it was made a brief description of the economic situation of the company in the 
moment they realized they needed a restructuration. It was described the values of the 
luggage sales in the different regions, as well as, the valued of the EBITDA of the company. 
The fourth section of the case revolves around the restructuration that affected the company 
in 2009, and the measures that Tim Parker took in order to revitalize the company. It describes 
extensively the changes that happened in terms of corporate structure as well as in terms of 
strategy orientation.  
Finally, the last piece of the case describes the status of Samsonite in 2011, when it completed 
its initial public offering in the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong and the challenges for the future. 
 
Teaching Purpose 
The Samsonite’s case is suitable to develop the skills and competences of graduate students 
who already undertook basic economics, business and strategy courses. The case is intended 
to be taught at master’s level in strategy subjects, in order to make known to students how a 
leading company can be so badly affected by market changes and how can the same company 
make a turnaround and resume its successful path. 
 
The case requires from students to:  
- Analyze the external context of the global luggage market along the time, highlighting 
the main drivers for the company’s crisis;  
- Understand the dangers of failing in sensing opportunities and threats and in making 
late decisions in a dynamic environment; 
- Analyze the top management team’s role in an environment in crisis; 
- Understand how the strategic decisions implemented have impacted the resource 
base of the company.  
 
The instructor should have already presented to their students the view and a case dedicated 
to dynamic capabilities, so that they can better identify the external environment and 
dimensions in this case. Compaq in Crisis by Adrian Elton is a good case to introduce the topic. 
 






The Samsonite case illustrates how a leading and successful company has missed the trends in 
the market and industry. The company ignored the environment changes, when failed in 
sensing market opportunities and threats and in making timely decisions, thus, having a 
negative impact on the performance of the company.  
The case also demonstrate how strategic decisions, in this specific case taken by Tim Parker, 
can affect the dimensions described in the dynamic capabilities view, and put a company back 
on track.  
 It is intended that the case presents a detailed description of the drivers that led Samsonite to 
bankruptcy, as well as the response to these changes in order to allow the students to 
understand the difficulties that a fast changing competitive environment carries. 
 
Instructor Preparation 
For a easier understanding of the case, it is important that the instructor is familiar with 
dynamic capabilities view, and for this purpose, it would be suggested that the instructor 
should read the article “Dynamic Capabilities: A Review of Past Research and an Agenda for 
the Future,” (Ilídio Barreto, Journal of Management, January 2010), which presents a review of 
the literature and introduces the dynamic capabilities definition that can be used in this 
specific teaching case. Students should also have been informed about this literature before 
they read the case. 
The instructor should also learn more about Samsonite by reading the annual reports from the 
last years, which are available in their website and by reading the official prospectus of the 
company published in 2011 which is available in the internet. The official prospectus of the 
company provide an extensive global luggage market study published by Frost & Sullivan, it 
describes in detail all the strategies implemented by the company in the last years and offers a 
description of the different products in the different markets where the company operates. 
Finally, to obtain more information about the external environment at this specific period, it is 
suggested that the instructor read “the case for listing” where Kyle Gendreau, CFO of 
Samsonite is interviewed and talked about this specific turbulent period and about Samsonite 
in the Ernest & Young digital magazine called Capital insights.  
 
Suggested Assignment Questions 
Samsonite case first describes how a successful company has failed to address market changes, 
and then describes how the firm was able to give the turnaround, taking decisions in line with 





the dimensions of the dynamic capabilities view. The instructor should cover the case with the 
following questions: 
 
Question 1 - Characterize Samsonite’s external environment in the mid-2000s, namely the 
exogenous shocks.  
 
Regarding this question students are not necessarily required to use a specific framework to 
perform this analysis although they should be able to identify: 
- Luggage industry is a very saturated market where there is several competitors 
offering the same type of products for different prices; 
- Samsonite is the leader in the luggage market and it is considerable ahead from its 
competitors;  
- Global luggage revenues are increasing over time and is expected to increase even 
more; 
- The relative importance of revenues is still higher in mature markets than in markets in 
developing countries, but the growth on the mature markets is much lower than the 
growth in markets in developing countries 
 
Growth of Luggage revenues 2006 - 2010 2010 - 2015 
Markets in developing countries   
Asia (except Japan) 13.1% 11.5% 
Latin America 3.5% 5.9% 
Mature markets   
United States 0.6% 3.7% 
Europe 2.3% 4% 
Japan  -1.3% -1.4% 
Total 3% 5% 
 
- In the same rein, mature markets spend more money on luggage and travel than 
markets in developing countries, although the growth of expenditures on luggage and 









Growth expenditure on luggage and travel 2010 - 2015 
Markets in developing countries  
Asia (expect Japan) 10.3% 
China  18.4% 
India 13.9% 
South Korea  5.9% 
Latin America  4.9% 
Mature Markets  




- The luggage industry can be influenced by external events which are not controlled by 
the company and this was dramatic for Samsonite (eg. 11/9 terrorist attacks, SARS 
epidemic); 
- There is a direct correlation between economic recession and the propensity to spend 
money on travel. Between 2007 and 2009 there was a big drop in the worldwide GDP 
and consequently a huge decrease in the expenditures on travel; 
 
Question 2 - In what way did Samsonite fail, leading to the decrease in its performance? 
Please consider the four dimensions that compose the dynamic capabilities view in your 
analysis. 
  
In this question it is expected that students have already understood the global luggage 
market in this period of time and now it is expecting that, by using the four dimensions of the 
dynamic capabilities view, students understand what failed in Samsonite’s strategy. 
Regarding the first dimension about the propensity to sense opportunities and threats, 
students should be able to state that Samsonite despised the exponential growth of the 
luggage revenues in Asia and Latin America as well as the growth on the spending on travel in 
Asia and Latin America countries. Another important change that Samsonite failed to sense 
was the increase of the middle class in Asia, especially in China and India. Samsonite has been 
focus only on the high end market, ignoring the medium end market which was exponentially 
growing. The company has been leader of the luggage market for the past decades and was 
comfortable with its strategy, forgetting to look at the market trends. It is clear that the 
propensity to sense opportunities and threats was relatively low. 





The propensity to make timely decisions can also be considered relatively low at that time, as, 
it has shown a very late response to market changes. Samsonite only decided to move to 
markets in developing countries when the performance of the company decreased 
substantially, analyzed through the adjusted EBITDA values of the company.  
In what concerns its propensity to make market-oriented decisions at that time, it can also be 
considered relatively low since the company was not aware of the market changes, and 
because of that, it could not make decisions that would respond to those changes.  The lack of 
market consciousness led Samsonite to make some counter market-oriented decision, such as 
focus its strategies on mature markets instead on the markets in developing and focus on the 
high end market (luxury handbags and Italian shoe product line), forgetting the middle class 
and the low end market. 
Finally, the propensity to change its resource base was also low at that time. Samsonite lacked 
in providing adequate resources and capabilities, namely sufficient know-how to make the 
fulfillment of demands in markets in developing, (e.g. in China, South Korea and India) and 
sufficient distribution centers to supply a market as the Asian market. Additionally, in 
order to compete successfully, the company would need to have a higher know-how about 
the Asian market which is a huge segmented market composed by all types of different 
segments. Adding to that, in order to be successfully, the company would also need a 
more wide-ranging distributor centre in the Asian market and more solid joint ventures 
with its partners. The company made its first joint venture in Asia, in 1995, but only in 
2006, the company realized how strong the Asian market was and decided to transform all 
the joint ventures built until this time, in owned subsidiaries of the company. In that year, 
the joint ventures built in the previous years in India, Singapore, South Korea and China, 
became to belong to the company. After that, Samsonite also increased its county list, by 
adding majority-owned joint ventures in Australia, Thailand, Indonesia and Philippines.  
Samsonite showed a low level of dynamic capabilities at this point and it was not achieving 
the adaptation required to maintain its strong market position. 
 
Propensity to sense opportunities and threat Low 
Propensity to make timely decisions Low 
Propensity to make market-oriented 
decisions 
Low 
Propensity to change its resource base Low 





Question 3 - In your opinion, the occurred turnaround has incorporated any elements of 
dynamic capabilities? 
 
In this question it is required that students realize that the turnaround have incorporated the 
four dimensions of dynamic capabilities. 
The appointment of Tim Parker as CEO of Samsonite should be immediately identified as the 
beginning of the turnaround. Students should also identify that Parker’s first decision was 
related to a cost base reduction on the company. The re-adjustment of the firm’s strategy was 
implemented afterwards. Most of the decisions made by Parker can be viewed along the 
dynamic capabilities’ dimensions.  The propensity to sense opportunities and threats was 
visible in the company and could be seen in several situations: 
 
- Perception that the firm should focus on Asia rather than on United States and Europe; 
- Increase in the frequency of introduction of new and innovated products are launched, 
especially in mature markets; 
 
Concerning the propensity to make timely decisions, it is expected that students realize that 
most of Samsonite’s decisions did not take place in a timely manner until this point. The 
company has simply reacted to the decrease in performance, rather than anticipating to it. 
However, with Tim Parker, the firm quickly filed to the Chapter 11 and embraced a complete 
business restructuring. Below are listed several measures taken by the company which show 
the propensity to make timely decisions: 
 
- Investment on American Tourister brand -  more advertising on Asia, increase of the 
number of points of sales and design products that correspond to the customer 
preferences to respond to the increase of the middle class in this region; 
- Negotiation of lower freight prices; 
- Improvement of the terms of trade and business relationships with suppliers;  
- Increase the degree of autonomy in the four geographic regions, while retaining 
centralized management over brand consistency, sourcing and finance. 
  
The propensity to make market-oriented decisions was confirmed by the following: 
 





- Focus on the growth of markets in developing  - expansion of the distribution network,  
increase the points of sales, expansion of geographical coverage and development of 
product ranges tailored to local customer’s preferences in each region; 
- Increase penetration in mature markets - use the existing strong brand awareness and 
the extensive distribution network to increase the company’s revenues and 
penetration of the business and casual product categories; 
- Develop American Tourister as a brand that reflects quality and reliability as Samsonite 
but with lower prices so that the company cover the lower target market; 
 
Finally, there are also some evidences regarding the propensity to change its resource base: 
 
- Reduction in the number of stores – 84 closed stores in United States and 31 closed 
stories in Europe; 
- Reduction in the number of employees - less 115 employees in United States and less 
505 employees in Europe; 
- Elimination of global management team positions where functions were duplicated; 
- Close the global executive headquarter in London; 
- Change the structure of the company to a Luxembourg holding structure; 
- Rationalization of the manufacturing and distribution operations in Europe; 
- Close local sales office in Europe and Latin America, shifting toward third-party 
distributors; 
- End unprofitable non-core business operations - luxury handbag joint ventures and the 
Italian-based shoe product line; 
- Ability to raise a huge amount of capital; 
- Expansion of points of sales, geographical coverage and reinforce the brand in Asian 
markets. 
 
Propensity to sense opportunities and threat Medium/ High 
Propensity to make timely decisions High 
Propensity to make market-oriented 
decisions 
High 
Propensity to change its resource base High 
 
 





Question 4 – In your opinion, the decision of launching an IPO in the Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange was justified?  
 
In this question, students are expected to analyze the advantages and the disadvantages of 
making an IPO in Hong Kong Stock Exchange. 
Benefits Disadvantages 
Opportunity to raise and refinance the 
company by HK$9.73 billion (1.25 billion 
dollars); 
Samsonite had to narrow the indicative price 
range from HK$13.5-HK$17.50 to HK$14.50-
HK$15.50 before the IPO, which gives 
negative signs to the market; 
Hong Kong is considered the biggest market 
for IPOs for the last years; 
On the average, the P/E ratio for Asia (ex-
Japan) consumer companies is 20.1 times, in 
Samsonite’s case was 18.3 times; 
Asia is the biggest, fastest growing and most 
profitable region for Samsonite; 
Experts in IPO believe that the timing of 
Samsonite’s listing wasn’t the best. 
Asia is the region with the best long-term 
growth prospects for Samsonite; 
 
IPO allowed partial exit for its old 
shareholders; 
 
The price per share fell 7.7% in the first day, 
on average the price used to fall 8%; 
 
Listing on the HK Exchange helped the 




















This teaching case is prepared for a 90-minute class, as long as the students are already 
familiarized with the dynamic capabilities’ view and have previously examined the case before. 
 
Topic Time (minutes) 
Review the Dynamic Capabilities view 10 
Summarize Samsonite’s Case 15 
Question 1 10 
Question 2 15 
Question 3 20 
Question 4 10 























The aim of this section is to relate the dynamic capabilities literature to the real business 
situation witnessed by Samsonite. 
In this thesis, I have used the definition proposed by Barreto (2010), since it is the most recent 
and encompassing one: “A dynamic capability is the firm’s potential to systematically solve 
problems, formed by its propensity to sense opportunities and threats, to make timely and 
market-oriented decisions, and to change its resource base.” 
This definition suggests that a dynamic capability is composed by four different but connected 
dimensions, namely, the firm’s propensities to (1) sense opportunities and threats, (2) to make 
timely and (3) market-oriented decisions, and to (4) change its resource base. The four 
dimensions are interconnected and no dimension alone can represent the construct.  
Under this view, it is possible to present an explanation for the Samsonite’s history.  
The propensity to sense market opportunities and threats, also known as “capability 
monitoring” (Schreyogg & Kliesch-Eberl, 2007), has been described by past research as one of 
the critical abilities for companies succeed in changing environments (Teece, 2007).  
Furthermore, research has also suggested that the perception of an exogenous shock as a 
threat or as an opportunity also influences how the firm responds to the event (Gilbert, 2006). 
The Samsonite case helps to illustrate the importance of being able (or not) to perceive the 
opportunities and threats in the market. To start, the company failed to fully sense the growth 
in the markets in developing countries (especially in Asia) as an opportunity for the company. 
The company was operating under the same business strategy for decades, not presenting any 
ability to monitoring the market, and this has contributed for the failure of the company. 
Samsonite did not perceive the exogenous shocks of the increase of middle class in Asia as an 
opportunity nor the saturation in the mature markets as a threat, but with the reorganization 
in 2009, the company started to operate differently. The company decided to negotiate lower 
freight prices and also improve the terms of trade and business relationships with its suppliers. 
In the mature markets, the company increased the frequency with which new and innovated 
products were launched, while in markets in development, the company developed the 
American Tourister brand.  
The case supports the idea that the ability to sense changes in a firm’s competitive 
environment is an essential condition to succeed in dynamic environments. 
The propensity to make timely decisions was also recommended for several scholars to firms 
competing in very dynamic environments. Several studies have argued that the timing of 





decisions, in particular being ahead of competitors (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Teece et al., 
1997), is essential for achieving competitive advantage.  
Again, in the Samsonite case, the company was not able to sense the changes in the market, 
thus showing a very late response to market changes. Only when the adjusted EBITDA valued 
of the company decreased substantially, the company took the initiative to respond in an 
adequately way to the market. If the company was more attentive to the market trends, the 
company would be able to change its strategy and the crisis situation could be avoid. With the 
reorganization of 2009, the company increased the degree of autonomy in the four geographic 
regions, retaining centralized management over brand consistency, sourcing and finance, thus 
becoming faster in building responses to the market changes.  
The third dimension in the definition, the propensity to make market-oriented decisions is 
crucial to achieve a successful market adaptation. Although timely decision making is relevant 
for dynamic capabilities, as it was mentioned before, the content of such decision is equally or 
even more important (Adner and Helfat, 2003). Other findings suggest that market orientation 
can even be transformed into a dynamic capability when complemented with reconfiguration 
capabilities (Menguc and Auh, 2006).  
In the case of Samsonite, it is possible to state that the market-oriented decisions were more 
important than the time when those decisions happened. Until the reorganization time, the 
company was operating mainly in the mature markets, after that the company changed its 
strategy and decided to focus on markets in developing countries. The company also decided 
to develop the American Tourister brand which until that time, was an acquired brand without 
so many importance for Samsonite. Although these decisions were significantly late in time, 
the content of such decisions were decisive for the turnaround of the company.  
The suggestion made in the literature that market orientation can be transformed in a dynamic 
capability when complemented with reconfiguration capabilities can also be applied in the 
Samsonite’s case. The fact that the company started to manage its resources in a different 
manner was essential to help the company in making good market oriented decisions. The firm 
decided to drop some resources, leverage other resources and develop new ones, thus being 
able to change the (market-oriented) decisions of the company. This happened, for example, 
when the company decided to develop the American Tourister, a brand that has been part of 
the company since 1994, in a different direction, by operating the brand in a new market, the 
Asian market, where the middle class was increasing. 
The propensity to change the resource base is the last dimension in the dynamic capabilities’ 
definition and it is the final crucial step to achieve market adaptation (Eisenhardt & Martim, 





2000; Helfat et al, 2007). It includes the firm’s propensity to create, extend and reconfigure the 
resource base (Teece et al., 1997) to fit the strategic decisions. Scholars have highlighted the 
importance of not only to make the right decisions at the right time, but also in building new 
resource configurations to achieve a long-term competitive advantage.  
Samsonite was amazing in building a new resource configuration. The company was able to 
change significantly its resource base in a very short period of time, by reducing its number of 
stores by 105 and the number of employees by 620 employees in the mature markets. The 
company was also able to eliminate the global management team positions that were 
duplicated and closed the global executives headquarter in London. Unprofitable non-core 
business operations were finished too. It was rationalized the manufacturing and the 
distribution operations in Europe and the holding the structure of the company was changed 
to the Luxembourg. At the same time, they increased the number of selling points and other 
resources in Asia.  
In the case of Samsonite, the success of the company happened when the four dimensions 
were improved significantly. 
The relationship between firms’ dynamic capabilities and performance has been much 
discussed too. Some scholars have argued that there is a direct relationship between firm’s 
dynamic capabilities and firm’s performance (Makadok, 2001; Teece et al., 1997; Zollo & 
Winter,2002), stating that dynamic capabilities view explains the level of success and failure of 
the firms. Other scholars believe that dynamic capabilities does not necessarily lead to a 
superior performance (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Helfat et al, 2007) and that dynamic 
capabilities are necessary, but not sufficient conditions for competitive advantage. Finally, 
other scholars suggest that there is an indirect relationship between dynamic capabilities and 
performance (Zahra et al., 2006; Winter, 2003). In this approach, dynamic capabilities may 
damage rather than improve the firm’s performance if dynamic capabilities are used when 
there is no need or when assumptions used by firms are wrong. 
In the Samsonite case the relationship between firm’s dynamic capabilities and firm’s 
performance has been very positive. The performance of the company improved substantially, 
with an increase of the adjusted EBITDA of 241% one year after the reorganization and with 
the listing of the company in the Hong Kong Stock Exchange in 2011. It is not possible to 
comment on the long terms results of the company, but from the reorganization so far, both 
sales and EBITDA have increased with an average rate of 20% and 100% per year, respectively, 
which are amazing results for a company that was almost bankruptcy few years ago. 





To conclude, the Samsonite case provides insight and illustrates how actual management 
practices are related to strategic management theory, and more specifically with the dynamic 































The dynamic capabilities view has emerged with the need to explain how firms can be 
successful in dynamic environments. The high number of research studies concerning this topic 
is indicative of its relevance, especially nowadays, when the market is constantly changing. 
This paper was built around the recent conceptualizations of dynamic capabilities view and a 
teaching case was written to provide additional evidence for the importance of this view to the 
business world. 
 Samsonite’s case illustrates how important having dynamic capabilities can be, even for well 
established firms. The company was focusing too much on the mature markets, which have 
been profitable for the past decades and has forgotten the rest of the market. The company 
was not attentive and did not realize the potential in markets in developing countries. With a 
low level of sensing the opportunities and threats of the market, Samsonite had no structure 
to develop the other three dimensions, and this had a negative impact on its performance. 
With the aim to recover from the struggling situation, new shareholders and top management 
took the lead of the firm. The company has finally sensed the potential of doing business in 
markets in developing countries and has changed its strategic decisions and resource base, 
recovering and improving its performance in a couple of years. 
Finally, it is possible to conclude through this paper that the dynamic capabilities concept is 
quite relevant in current economies and that its four dimensions are decisive for firms’ 
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